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1. Introduction
In election campaigns, political parties promise a lot of improvements to their voters. Later on, after the 
elections, these parties have to realize these promises. If a party becomes a member of the governing 
coalition, many of these promises have to become visible in the coming policy. Realizing all promises 
at once is not realistic because compromises with other parties are necessary. However, also when a 
party will become a member of the opposition, she will try to realize her promises. The party might 
do this by trying to make that what should not happen in her view will not take place or in any way by 
trying to give policies a move into the direction she desires.
Individual coalition parties also might want to adjust the policy when at some point a party 
believes more can be realized than is agreed on with the other coalition parties. How much can be 
realized depends on the space that parties gave each other during negotiations. This space is used in the 
debate, especially in the use and formulation of motions, expressions of a judgment or a wish, a party 
tries to find out what is possible and what not.
Here, motions become important. Motions are the most encompassing form of parliamentary 
activity. The motion is an official statement, in which (one or more members of) a parliament (usually 
as representative[s] of one or more parties) in general asks some act (usually a change in policy) from 
the government. The motion is a way to make visible where parties and government stand with respect 
to an issue under discussion and it also makes clear what the parliament wants from the government.
To get a motion passed one needs the support of other parties, but in the final voting also, 
the standpoint taken by the government is relevant. Actually, the position taken by parliament and 
government plays an important role. This position based on interactions during the debate can be made 
visible using a game-theoretic representation in a cognitive map. This representation shows forms of 
cooperation or conflict between the parliament and the government (Popping and Wittek, 2015).
Today, it looks as if a culture is growing to use motions also to draw attention to a particular 
position. The party wants to inform the audience/public about this position in this way. Whether this 
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position has broad support in the House is less relevant. Proposing a motion has become more important 
than the outcome of the vote regarding that motion; participating is more important than winning. The 
goal of this paper is to investigate whether this tendency is true. Are such motions used in a specific 
field, do they pass the vote, who proposes them?
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, motions are introduced and arguments to propose 
them are presented. In the next sections, the outcome of the voting on the motion, and especially, the 
factors, on which this is dependent, get attention. The information about arguments to propose a motion 
is added to a model that explains the outcome of the voting. In the section, that follows the data are 
introduced, and after that, the results of the analyses are presented, and finally, conclusions are drawn 
on the role of the intention of the motion.
2. Arguments for Proposing Motions
In performing, their task members of parliament have various recourses at their disposal to supervise 
the government. The motion is one of these. Originally, this instrument was intended for members 
of the House of Representatives to allow this supervisory role. For this, of course, in the first place, 
the debate with the government is used. After such a debate a motion can be used to pass judgment 
in a dispute with the responsible secretary. When a motion passes, a clear signal is given to the 
government.
In the Netherlands, motions proposed in parliament have to pass the vote. In case, this does not 
happen the government does not have to take them into account. When they passed the vote, however, 
the government is not obliged to do what is asked for, but usually, the government does.
The probability of getting a motion passed in the voting is most of all determined by whom 
proposed it, a member of a coalition or an opposition party and by the fact whether before the vote takes 
place parliament and government share their feeling about the motion or not. The debate itself generally 
does not make these positions that clear.
One argument to propose a motion is that one wants to adapt the government’s policy as was 
indicated above. Sometimes, the motion is used to record the conclusion of debate. Another purpose 
is to ask the government to make some information available. Remember, one task of the parliament 
is controlling the government, to be able to do so relevant information is necessary. The motion might 
also be used to find out where the government stands. These are the arguments that occur most and that 
are intended in the law.
Over time, however, motions did get a different function. The signal that is issued with a motion 
increasingly focuses on the world outside the House of Representatives (Schutte, 2009). Today, motions 
are also used to draw attention to a particular position. Whether this position has broad support in the 
House is less important. Proposing a motion has become more important than the outcome of the vote 
regarding that motion; participating is more important than winning. This is shown when we consider 
that the number of motions proposed in the last 20 years in the Netherlands is multiplied by a factor of 
five. Adjusting the policy did get a subordinate role. Therefore, motions have lost relevance as a means 
of control. In spite of this, altered function motions still contain information on the way parties not only 
try to exploit their space to negotiate but also how motions due to a lack of space to negotiate are used 
for other purposes.
Parliamentarians from coalition parties have other considerations when proposing and voting on 
motions than parliamentarians of opposition parties. They want to see their policies realized, and they 
want the coalition government to continue. Dutch coalition partners do not accept another coalition 
partner supporting or favoring motions that go against the coalition agreement (Holzhacker, 2002. 
p. 472). However, governing parties are interested in protecting their party’s interest in the government 
agreement and less in protecting the government as a whole. If a governing party in the coalition is 
discontented with a government agreement, the party may try to find partners in the opposition who 
support their position to change government policy (Holzhacker, 2002. p. 473).
The fact that proposing a motion might be more relevant than getting it passed might be viewed 
from the perspective of agenda setting and building. An Agenda is a “set of issues that are communicated 
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in a hierarchy of importance at a point in time” (Rogers and Dearing, 1988). An issue is a social problem, 
which is often contradictory. Agenda setting is the creation of public awareness and concern of salient 
issues by the news media. A motion might serve in this context. It is used to get the issue on the agenda, 
or the proposer wants to claim that the issue has his or her attention. He or she is the one working on 
the problem. Within the European Union, this is quite common. With respect to this, union’s policy 
Princen (2011) distinguishes two challenges in putting issues on the agenda: Gaining attention and 
building credibility. Gaining attention for an issue implies that one tries to get (potential) supporters to 
pay attention to the issue. In our situation, these supporters might be not only the other members of the 
House but also the government, and even the audience, the voters. Building sufficient credibility means 
that these others have to become convinced that the proposing party is well placed to deal with the issue.
Research on agenda-formation processes suggests that the relative salience of an issue on the 
media agenda determines how the public agenda is formed. A politician can show that an issue has the 
attention, and as it is already in the media, it can be entered into the discussion in parliament now. The 
parliamentarian can also have an own issue, but this can be brought to the public for support via the 
media. Introducing it at once in parliament is not excluded, but has risks; the other parliamentarians 
should be prepared.
This leads to the following research question: Is it possible to trace such motions that are actually 
only meant to make a statement and, if so, do they have any effect on the outcome of the voting?
3. Known Factors Affecting the Voting
Popping and Wittek (2015) investigated factors that affect the outcome of the voting on the motions. 
Three groups of variables have been distinguished that play a role: (1) The fact whether the proposer of 
the motion is a member of a coalition or an opposition party, (2) potential voting power the proposing 
party of parties have themselves, and (3) the potential power the government has. Hereafter, the three 
groups are discussed.
3.1. Proposer is from coalition or opposition party
Since the introduction of dualism (i.e., the separation of powers between parliament and cabinet) into 
Dutch politics, one of the functions of parliament is to control the government. As a consequence, the 
initiative for motions does not only come from the opposition but also from parties of the governing 
coalition. The opposition usually wants to follow some other policy than the governing parties. 
Therefore, they will use all opportunities they have at their disposal to realize as much as possible 
of their wishes. Holzhacker (2002. p. 471) showed that Dutch governing parties tend to protect their 
party’s interests rather than the interests of the government as a whole (Holzhacker, 2002. p. 473). So, 
if a governing party in the coalition is not satisfied with a government agreement or some plan should 
be realized earlier or faster, the party tries to find partners in the opposition who support their position 
to change government policy. Hence, the number of proposing parties allows inferring the so-called 
voting potential of motion, i.e., the number of favorable votes a motion might elicit.
3.2. Power parties have
Parties propose motions. In general, there are two reasons to do so. Usually, the party wants to change a 
policy or additional information to be able to perform her control task before it was already mentioned 
that today parties might also ask attention for some policy or want to make a statement.
Support among members in parliament is measured in two ways. First, there is more support for 
a motion when more members of other parties than the proposing one subscribe a motion. Second, 
one might also look at the voting potential. In a lot of countries, among which the Netherlands, parties 
usually vote as a block. Therefore, the interaction within the parliament can be analyzed in terms of 
the interaction occurring between the parties not among individual members of parliament (Andeweg, 
1992. p. 167; Holzhacker, 2002. p. 471). It implies that in general when a party subscribes a motion, all 
members of that party in parliament will vote in favor of the motion. Therefore, it is commonly already 
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known on beforehand how many votes a motion will get as a minimum. This number is the voting 
potential. Having the support of a party having many members is more attractive than the support of a 
small party.
Hypothesis 1 (Voting Power): The likelihood that a motion is accepted increases (a) if it is 
proposed by a member of a coalition party, (b) the higher the number of parties supporting it, or (c) the 
higher the voting potential.
3.3. Power the government has
Support from the side of the government is also relevant. In case, the government supports the motion 
or has at least sympathy the probability might increase that the motion will pass the vote. The support 
becomes visible in the advice the government has (according to the law) to provide with respect to the 










Positive arguments are more difficult to categorize. The government usually states that it is a good 
argument and she will support it, has sympathy for it, or uses a comparable formulation.
The advice itself does not contain any information regarding the negotiation process that took 
place in parliament. This information, however, becomes clear in a cognitive map containing a game-
theoretic representation of what is going on. Therefore, it is more useful to look at such a representation.
 Parties propose motions, the government advices with respect to accepting the motion or 
not. The interaction can be represented as a game. Will the government follow the proposing 
party? The party takes the position that the government did nothing (yet) to overcome a problem 
or has not recognized a problem yet, and therefore, the party (already) offers a good solution. If 
the government agrees, it is hurrayed for the party. However, if the government makes clear that 
she already acted as was asked for, there is a vain parliamentarian. In both situations, however, 
there is cooperation. The government might disagree with the motion; this might concern not only 
the procedure but also the content. The government already acted and what is proposed is not in 
line with this or even opposes it. If the request is in line, however, the government can take the 
position that the motion was not necessary. Hence, there is a conflict. This also is true when the 
government did not act (yet), but nevertheless disagrees with that what is proposed. The cognitive 
maps of game-theoretic representations that are used represent coordination (coordination game, 
battle of the sexes game) or conflict (social dilemma game, pure competition game). The models 
are summarized in Figure 1. The proposer of the motion is negative about an issue and proposes 
some change to make the judgment positive. The government was at first negative or positive 
about the issue, and at the end of the discussion (so in the advice), she is negative or positive. This 
means the government can change position. A more detailed elaboration is presented in Popping 
and Wittek (2015).
Both positions taken by the government might have a consequence for the motion. If the 
government is willing to do what is asked for the motion might be withdrawn, because it is not 
necessary anymore. The proposing party, however, might also recognize the motion will not make 
it, and therefore, withdraws the motion. It also happens quite often that the motion does not come 
to the vote. The proposer knows what will happen in the vote but still has the possibility to bring 
the motion to the vote. He or she still has a possibility to explain that what is asked for is important 
for the party.
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Hypothesis 2 (Social dilemmas): The likelihood that motion is accepted decreases with the severity 
of the underlying social dilemma, being highest for motions of the coordination and battle of the sexes 
type, and lowest for motions of the prisoner’s dilemma and pure competition type.
Figure 1: Graphical representation of different types of social dilemmas and payoff matrices, (a) Coordination 
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3.4. Power of the intention of the motion
Parliamentarians might have different intentions when they propose a motion. There is a distinction 
between motions which aim at changing the government’s policy position and motions that do not do 
this but that seem to be designed to make a statement (Goeree and Popping, 2014). This distinction is in 
line with Schutte (2009), a publication that was already mentioned. The first group of motions always 
contains a request to adjust policy or to provide information. Therefore, the motion is labeled a question 
mark motion. The second group always contains a statement about the policy, and therefore, is labeled 
an exclamation mark motion. The exclamation mark motions are divided into positive and negative 
exclamation mark motions. Positive exclamation mark motions appreciate the policy in a positive way 
and will, therefore, rather be proposed by coalition parties than by opposition parties. Such motions are 
exclusive. For negative exclamation mark motions the opposite applies. Opposition parties use negative 
exclamation mark motions to react against the government and to ask for attention for this actuality. 
There are several arguments to do so: (1) the party is rebelling against the government in general, 
(2) the party wants to get an issue on the agenda as she believes it is important, (3) the party wants to 
emphasize that (a part of) an issue that is already on the agenda needs still more attention Andeweg, 
1992. It is expected that such motions will especially be proposed when the space for negotiation is 
minimal because it is no use to try to change the government policy position for those files. Publicity 
is the highest a party can get.
With respect to issues where not everything is already set, the opposition will see an opportunity 
to realize some of her own goals. In such situations, it may be useful to try to send the government into 
a particular direction using question mark motions.
With regard to question mark motions also two types are distinguished, namely, motions containing 
a request for action and motions requesting information. Using this last type of motion might sometimes 
be a way to postpone a policy decision. Before the intended policy can start the government has to look 
at something that might have some meaning for the decision. Such motions are not recognized based 
on the formulation of the text; the information should come from the proposer.
Problematic is the recognition of motions that are intended to make a statement. In fact, the 
person proposing the motion should classify it as such, but it is highly questionable whether someone 
is willing to do so as it is not exactly in line with the motivation included in the law. A next possibility 
is that clear features are available based on which an outsider, i.e., an investigator can decide whether 
the motion’s goal is to make a point. Sometimes, the goal will be obvious, but in most situations, 
it will not be possible. A third possibility is to use a specific operationalization which can be used 
as indication for the type of motion that is looked for. In that case, the exclamation mark motion is 
one such operationalization of a motion that is intended to make a statement. This type of motion is 
obviously recognized as clear criteria can be formulated as will be shown later.
We can investigate whether exclamation motion or not effects the result of the voting. No matter 
the outcome, the next point of discussion is whether the operationalization seems a good one or not.
Following the reasoning above, a new hypothesis is formulated:
Hypothesis 3 (Making a statement): The likelihood that motion is accepted decreases if the 
proposer seems to have the intention to propose the motion to make a statement.
To test these hypotheses, we need in part to repeat the analyses performed in Popping and Wittek 
(2015), the fact whether the proposer seems to want to make a statement is added.
4. Data
The data set employed in Goeree and Popping (2014) are used. Here, motions and votes on motions 
in two fields have been collected for two governments. The Balkenende government was in charge in 
the Netherlands from February 22, 2007, until October 14, 2010. This is including the caretaker period 
that began on February 20, 2010. As the caretaker status in the first place means that little new policy 
is developed and motions do not deal with new policies, there is no reason to keep these motions out 
of the research. The Rutte government lasted from October 14, 2010, until April 23, 2012, the day the 
171
Australasian Journal of Law, Ethics and Governance (AJLEG)
cabinet stood back because the tolerating party (see here after) did not want to support the government 
anymore due to measures to be taken.
The motions used in the study cover two fields: Environmental policy (including animal welfare) 
and migration (especially immigration) policy. Both fields periodically revisit the agenda, which makes 
that a lot of motions are available. These two fields were necessary because of the study, for which the 
data were originally collected. The idea was that environmental policy did not get special attention 
in one of the two governments. The issue was supposed to be both times equally important as with 
respect to this issue there were no ideological differences between the two governments. This does not 
hold for the migration policy. The issue had a lot of attention in the Rutte government; the government 
agreement contained a lot of rules regarding the issue. In part, this was necessary because, to get a 
majority, the parties participating in the government needed the support of an extra party. This extra 
party did not participate in the government but tolerated the government in exchange for the extra 
rules. Migration and also integration constitute a new line of conflict in Dutch parliament since 2002. 
Andeweg and Irwin, 2005; Kriesi and Frey (2008) showed that this issue of migration and integration is 
part of the left-right line of conflict. The increased parliamentary attention to migration has not resulted 
in a new line of conflict: Instead, the left-right line of conflict has been reinforced.
The Rutte government was outgoing until September 12, 2012. During this time, 68 motions have 
been proposed, 20 on migration policy, and 48 on environmental policy. However, as the agreement in 
the toleration construction was no longer valid, these motions are not entered in the analyses.
Motions and results of the voting are found using the search engine official publications’ on a 
website provided by the Dutch government (“overheid.nl”). By searching on the period and the code 
for the field, the necessary data could be found. The motions and the corresponding results of the voting 
are copied to a text document. Next, with the help of a computer program, all relevant information is 
exported to a data file. This file contains variables such as date, issue, name, and party of the proposer 
of the motion and cosignatories and the results of the voting.
With regard to the delimitation of the two fields, a fairly broad definition is used. Issues within 
the fields received attention during the whole period that is investigated. Only the final version of 
the motion is included, i.e., motions that have been adapted are not considered. Besides, motions are 
classified as exclamation mark motions or question mark motions. Details concerning the way, this 
division was made follow hereafter. The division is based on the formulation of the text in the motion, 
not on a classification by the proposer of the motion. Details and information on the accuracy of the 
coding can be found in Goeree and Popping (2014). In total 296 motions have been selected, 49 of these 
have not come to the vote. Among the ones that did not come to the vote were 9 exclamation mark 
motions (1 was withdrawn, 4 have expired, and 4 have been replaced). One motion was addressed to 
the House itself, for that reason, the position taken by the government is not known. Now, 246 motions 
remain. A total of 51 of these motions (just over 20%) are exclamation mark motions, based on the way 
of measuring that is explained in the next section. The ratio of motions on environment versus motions 
on	migration	that	came	to	the	vote	does	not	differ	for	the	two	cabinets	(χ²	=	0.47,	df	=	1,	P	=	0.47).
5. Measures
The dataset consists of one dependent variable (acceptance of motion), eight independent variables, 
and one control variable.
Acceptance: The dependent variable Acceptance was coded “1” if the majority of the members of 
the House of Representatives voted in favor of the motion. This information is publicly available on 
many websites, among which www.overheid.nl.
Proposer: The variable Proposer was coded “1” if the main proposer of the motion was a member 
of a coalition party and “0” if it was a member of the opposition.
Number of proposing parties: For each motion, the number of parties proposing it was counted.
Voting potential: For each motion, it was determined which parties supported it during the proposal 
stage. Subsequently, the number of members in the House of Representatives pertaining to these parties 
was counted. The variable voting potential consists of this count.
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Coordination game: The motion was coded “1” if the underlying cognitive map represented a 
coordination game and “0” otherwise.
Battle of the sexes game: The motion was coded “1” if the underlying cognitive map represented 
a battle of the sexes game and “0” otherwise.
Prisoner’s dilemma game: The motion was coded “1” if the underlying cognitive map represented 
a prisoner’s dilemma game and “0” otherwise.
Pure competition game: The motion was coded “1” if the underlying cognitive map represented a 
pure competition game and “0” otherwise.
Cabinet: In case the motion was proposed during the Balkenende IV government, this variable is 
coded “1,” and in case it has been proposed during the Rutte I government, the code “0” is used.
Exclamation: The variable exclamation was coded “1” if the motion was considered as an 
exclamation mark motion and “0” if it was a question mark motion. Exclamation and question mark 
motions are recognized based on a number of criteria. A category is assigned to a specific motion if at 
least half of the criteria set for that category are met. An exclamation mark motion contains a reference 
to existing policy or to an action or decision by a Secretary or by the Government. The motion puts 
this policy or this action or decision in a positive context using arguments that subscribe the policy or 
decision or action or in a negative context by the use of argumentation that rejects the policy or decision 
or action or that suggests a different approach. The motion includes a request or instruction for which it 
is clear from the beginning how the Secretary will respond. The highly subjective or emotional wording 
of the motion shows that making a statement is the main purpose of the motion. The question mark 
motions contain a reference to existing policies or to a situation or event for which the existing policies 
are not well prepared. In the motion, an undesired development or an undesired effect is observed. The 
motion contains a realistic request to adapt or to create new policies or take it over from another body. 
The relatively neutral and not offensive wording of the motion shows that achieving change is the main 
purpose of the motion. It might also be that the motion includes a request for information so that later 
a more careful assessment can take place (Bara et al., 2007).
6. Results
The first to be looked at is whether the exclamation mark motions have any impact on the probability 
of the vote being in favor or not. This is shown in Table 1.
Logistic regression is applied, the outcome of the vote is the dependent variable (reference 
category is rejection of the motion). Six models were estimated. In each model, one or more independent 
variables are entered in line with the theory: First, the control variable (the cabinet), next whether the 
main proposer is member of a coalition party or not, as third the variables related to the voting power, 
after that the game-theoretic representations, and finally, the type of motion (exclamation mark or 
not). The outcomes of the logistic regression analysis as presented in the first four models in this table 
are not different from the ones in Popping and Wittek (2015); from model 5, on the type of motion 
comes in, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. The probability to pass the vote is far greater when the proposing 
parliamentarian is a member of one of the coalition parties. This also is true for Hypothesis 2. The 
probability that the motion will not pass the vote increases when the discussion about the motion 
between parliament and government can be represented as a conflict game (pure competition or 
prisoner’s dilemma). Hypothesis 3, the type of motion (exclamation mark or not) shows a significant 
impact on whether the motion will pass the vote or not, is rejected.
To learn how it is possible that no confirmation is found for the third hypothesis, one has to look at 
the distribution of the question mark and exclamation mark motions. This distribution is highly skewed 
Baumgartner and Mahoney (2008). Already for that reason alone the variable is a difficult one to be 
used in predictions.
In the final model (model 6), 87.80% of the outcomes of the vote is predicted correctly. This implies 
that 30 out of the 246 outcomes are not predicted correctly; 10 motions are rejected while according to 
the model, they should have been accepted, 2 of these are exclamation mark motions. On the other hand, 
20 motions have been accepted while this should not have been the case, 3 of these are exclamation 
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mark motions. There is no difference in distribution between these characteristics. 4 motions were on 
migration (2 of which passed the voted, all were question mark motions) and 26 on the environment 
(here, 15 out of the 21 question mark motions passed the vote and 3 out of the 5 exclamation mark 
motions). The 21 motions for which a conflict model was found in the discussion between parliament 
and the government passed the vote except for 2 and only 1 out of 9 motions that gave rise to cooperation 
passed. This implies that in 8 situations, the government was willing to follow the motion, but the 
House decided that this was not necessary. This concerns for example motion 21501-08, nr. 361, where 
the government is asked to adapt existing plans concerning the environment as the EU is preparing a 
new plan that contains more restrictions and the government is also asked to perform a national cost-
benefit analysis using the plans the EU is talking about.
Most wrongly predicted were question mark motions on the environment: 15 conflict motions 
passed and 5 coordination motions have been rejected. Most of these motions were about animals in a 
national park that had problems in surviving in winter due to the cold weather. Parliamentarians wanted 
the government to intervene in the policy of those responsible by demanding measures for the animals. 
Questionable was whether the government should honor the layman parliamentarian’s feelings of pity 
or the expert’s policy according to which the animals had to survive by themselves. This all informs 
on why the results of voting are not predicted correctly; it does not inform on the impact of the type of 
motion on the voting.
To find some more background concerning situations, in which exclamation mark motions have 
been proposed Table 2 is presented. The ratio between question mark and exclamation mark motions 
increases when one looks at the number of motions in each group that passes the vote. 37.5% of the 
question mark motions passed the vote, and this is so for only 10% of the exclamation motions. This 
is a much lower percentage. These 10% were all motions about the environment; exclamation mark 
motions about migration never passed the vote. This indicates that the majority of the members in the 
parliament did not need the statement expressed in the motion. The government also did not need these 
motions. The distribution of the four game-theoretical representations among these motions is different 
from	the	distribution	found	among	 the	question	mark	motions	(χ²	=	9.49,	df	=	3,	P	=	0.023).	For	a	
relatively greater part of the exclamation mark motions, a conflict representation is found. One might 
argue that considering the tolerating party as a coalition party is not correct. Considering this party as a 
separate group does not affect the results of the log-linear regression.
It is still open now whether this is a general idea or whether this is based on what is agreed on by 
the parties supporting the government. During the Rutte government, 9 exclamation mark motions have 
been proposed, during the Balkenende government, these were 41 exclamation motions. Even if we 
take the length of the period of government for each cabinet in mind, it looks as if under Balkenende it 
was worth for the parties to make a point under Rutte they learned it is meaningless.
Before it was mentioned that in case a party only wants to make a statement support of other 
parties is not relevant. For that reason, the number of proposing parties has to be at least less when 
Table 1: Results logistic regression (B‑values)
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Cabinet −0.450	 −0.602	 −0.569 0.571 0.594
Main proposer from coalition party 3.532* 2.057* 1.425 1.446 1.850*
Number of proposing parties# −0.224 −0.299	 −0.259
Voting potential 0.048* 0.051* 0.046* 0.033*
Prisoner’s dilemma game −2.422* −.491* −2.946*
Pure competition game −2.601* −2.661* −2.956*
Battle of sexes game 1.183 1.098 
Type of motion −1.032	 −1.143	
R2 0.02 0.35 0.43 0.60 0.61 0.60
Dependent	variable:	Result	voting	(reference:	Not	passed).	*Significant	at	the	0.05	level,	n=246
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this is going on. The mean number of proposing parties for a question mark motion is 1.80, and for an 
exclamation	mark	motion,	it	is	1.30.	The	difference	is	significant	(t	=	2.87,	df	=	244,	P	=	0.00).
It is also believed that in general exclamation motions should not be used as they do not contribute 
to the general policy that is needed for a country. For this reason, other parties will not honor such 
motions, and therefore, will vote against such motions. This is also supported by the data. The number 
of exclamation mark motions that came to the vote is 51, 49 have been proposed by the opposition, and 
only 5 passed. 27.2% van de rejected motions were exclamation mark motions, 6.5% of the motions 
that passed where exclamation mark motions.
We have not been able to show that the fact whether an exclamation mark or a question mark 
motion is at hand contributes to the outcome of the voting. This result, however, needs more support 
from other sources. The distinction between the two types of motions is based on characteristics in the 
wording of the motions. The question whether this is a good method has not been answered.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
In this study, it was found that the fact whether the proposer of the motions is a member of a coalition 
party or not, the voting potential, and the representation of the type of game, as found in the discussion 
between parliament and government, have an impact on the result of the voting. It was not shown 
whether the fact that an exclamation mark or a question mark type motion is concerned matters. 
Exclamation mark motions are not intended according to the law. Therefore, they should not occur, but 
still, it happens.
It looks like the type of motion does not play a role in the voting process.  Further study, 
however, on the question how to determine whether a motion is only intended to make a statement or not 
is necessary. In this study, the distinction between exclamation mark and question mark type motions 
is based on characteristics found in the wording of the motion. Questionable is whether not only the 
criteria used are sufficiently accurate but also criteria that have not been considered at all might play a 
role. It even might turn out that it is impossible to make a decision based on the wording. Especially in 
the wording, it does not always allow an accurate decision one only can obtain the required information 
from the proposer of the motion. It is not to be expected, however, that parliamentarians will confess 
in public that making a statement is the reason for proposing a motion. Therefore, another method for 
deciding on this is necessary. Therefore, a choice based on a decision by raters remains necessary. This 
requires that the criteria for the decision should at least be considered once more. The same types of 
problems do rise if one concentrates on slowing down processes.
8. Notes
1. Other arguments might also play some role here. A party might make a statement to claim the 
Table 2: Motions that passed the vote or not
Type motion Issue Government Vote reject Pass Total
Question mark Environment Rutte 28 (32.9) 22 (36.7) 50
Balkenende 57 (67.1) 37 (62.7) 94
Migration Rutte 13 (34.2) 3 (23.1) 16
Balkenende 25 (65.8) 10 (76.9) 35
Exclamation mark Environment Rutte 5 (15.2) 4 (80.0) 9
Balkenende 28 (84.8) 1 (20.0) 29
Migration Rutte 1 (7.7) - 1
Balkenende 12 (92.3) - 12
Total 169 77 246
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ownership of the issue or to remember others (the government, other parties, the audience) to the 
fact that the issue is hers. In the context of voting especially emphasizing the competence owner-
ship, offering the best solutions (Lachat, 2014), might be relevant. This argument can be seen as 
part of the arguments listed in the text.
2. The party program of a new group that was formed in 2002 focused on migration and integration 
and advocated reform of the public sector. The leader, Fortuyn, dominated the following general 
election campaign. 9 days before, this election Fortuyn was shot (Andeweg and Irwin, 2005. p. 16). 
In the next election, the party lost her seats again, but another group took over. This new party also 
shares the focus on integration and migration. The party had the tolerating agreement with the Rutte 
government.
3. The coding of the two types of motions was performed by two independently operating raters. The 
amount	of	interrater	agreement	found	after	the	coding	task	was	finished	is	π	=	0.84	=	(0.93-0.55)/
(1.00-0.55);	standard	deviation	0	=	0.00,	z	=	238.54,	P	=	0.00;	n	=	296	(Scott,	1955;	Popping,	2010),	
which is in general considered as a good result. The coding of the games was already performed 
in an earlier phase of the project and is reported in Popping (2013). The interrater agreement was 
computed for two characteristics that are used in the game-theoretic model. The first concerned the 




4. Sometimes, it may be argued that question mark motions, in which the proposer asks for informa-
tion are in fact exclamation mark motions. Such motions are especially intended to slow down a 
specific process. The sample contains 7 motions in which information is asked for. In case these 
motions would have been coded as exclamation mark motions, one would not find different out-
comes in the analyses presented in Table 2. The same variables remain showing significant and 
insignificant effects; also, the explained variance does not change. Therefore, we do not consider 
this view any further.
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